documentary became suspect and despised between the 1960s and 1980s-the decades of Direct Cinema's dominance, with its austere observational, supposedly nonintervention dogme. Stoney resisted its seductions and, in the face of no little hostility, he insisted on the continued value of the Flaherty/Grierson template. In his seventyninth year, 1995, he was still proving his point. For his eighty-ninth title, he christened the largest wave of strikes in American history (in the Depression-era cotton mills of the Southeast) The Uprising of '34 , an account of which he then videotaped. 4 The film enabled communities that had buried memories of their resistance to exploitation and violence to recover their history and their pride. Rare though it was in its local impacts, The Uprising of '34 received no nods from the Emmys or other canonizing organizations. As with teaching, films made in such an old-fashioned mode for such unfashionably engagé reasons are also-largely-without honor.
But then Stoney wanted no honor in that sense. Deirdre Boyle reports that, when once asked how he wished to be remembered, he replied: ''as a very happy collaborator. '' 5 And this is the final factor contributing to his marginalization. The cinema pantheon has little space-and less honor-for players who provide ''assists.'' George Stoney's major accomplishment was, arguably, to do just this: ''assist.'' His greatest role was to ''make the play'' for all those he enabled, directly and indirectly, to speak for themselves via video as well as for the generations of his students, many of whom became his collaborators. ''George gave me the camera'' is their mantra and it explains why, despite his self-effacement, his few obituaries nevertheless spoke of him as a major pioneer-indeed the ''father''-of public access cable television. Or, even in the opinion of ex-FCC Commissioner Nick Johnson, possibly the ''father of YouTube.'' 6 Stoney had his own view of such encomia: ''Paternity is easy to ascribe and difficult to deny.'' 7 Martin Lucas, an ex-NYU Stoney student, would also take issue with Johnson's sobriquet:
I'd like to rescue George from YouTube. . . . It seems as though the web of media arts centers, access stations and production groups (like Paper Tiger) that are substantially his legacy, represented (and still to some extent do represent) a shared culture that web-based media platforms are not in a good position to further. 8 In fact, I take this concern about contextualizing Stoney the activist by technologies further yet, disputing Klein's opinion. Yes-for sure-Stoney ''loved people.'' He was a man of breathtaking humanity, warmth, and (as Boyle well notes) modesty. All this talk of personal impact, legacy, and importance would profoundly disinterest him. But, qua Klein, I query whether he even liked film. He always said he thought it an unfriendly, inaccessible technology-hating the fuss of cinematography, the waiting for rushes, and so on. 9 Rather, then, what must be noted is that more was at stake in his project than some already bypassed-or even futuristic-media platform. George loved people more. He told an interviewer in 1985: ''The last thing I want to do is develop media to get in the way of person-toperson interchange because . . . I think all communication should end with either a handshake or a kiss.'' 10 Stoney's grail was participation. The key pregnant moment in his biography is thus not whether he ''fathered'' this media platform or that. Nor is to be found in any of the documentaries he wrote, produced, and/or directed over the six-plus decades of his filmmaking; nor even in his stellar (and nearly equally long) career as an educator. It is the moment he starts to cross the bridge from conventional documentary filmmaking in any of its established modes into the participatory, the most salient and significant potentiality of today's ''documedia.'' That journey began in earnest at the National Film Board of Canada in 1968 when Stoney became the executive producer of its Challenge for Change program of overtly activist documentary production. It was in Montreal that he first glimpsed the possibilities of the moving image as a tool for social activism, not in the hands of engagé filmmakers such as himself (that was who he was, that he knew about). There his thinking began to coalesce around the idea that the media ought to be a tool for the documentary subjectfor the people themselves. And that insight is the source for Johnson's hyperbole.
This article thus revisits that moment and its sequel, the campaign for cable access channels in the United States that Stoney, Johnson, and others took up after Stoney returned to New York in 1970.
11 I now add to that with corroborating documentation gleaned from a (very) preliminary trawl through Stoney's paper archive-a massive collection of documents that have become available with his death.
George Stoney died on July 12, 2012, in Manhattan, leaving a huge collection of video access materials as well as some eight thousand carbon copies of letters and other writings dating back to the 1920s. The papers were found in the filing cabinets in George's final narrow little office at NYU. In the preceding May, those around him, his daughter Louise and others, had asked me to ensure that this precious cache of materials would become known in the academic community.
12 Let me add a personal note. The cache of papers answers one minor mystery about George: why would somebody so sensitive to the social implications of new communications technologies persist in using one-the typewriter-first patented in 1714? This thought increasingly occurred to me in the fortyone years of our acquaintance every time a typed communication arrived with an ever-greater number of smudged letters caused by damaged keys-especially after the last guy in New York to repair typewriters disappeared from view several years ago. Now I know the answer-George was making carbon copies. Consider this article, then, a glimpse of carbons yet to come.
''Films designed to promote social change'' George Stoney was drafted into the USAAF (US Army Air Forces) in 1942, serving in the 107th Tactical Reconnaissance Unit and the 360th Photoreconnaissance Unit in the United Kingdom. In the years immediately before this, Stoney had used Pare Lorentz's The River (1938) as a tool to open conversations at rural community meetings in the South that were organized by Roosevelt's Farm Settlement Administration, for which he worked-so that was enough, probably, for the Army to associate him with photography. In fact, he had been charged with the forbidding task of building white support for black sharecropper voter registration. The River-although essentially a classic ''problem moment'' documentary, infused with a punchpulling Southern take on US history-gave him a way into penetrating prejudices during post-screening discussions. For Stoney, these were as important as the screening itself. For him, it was the combination that demonstrated the power of film as a tool of communication preparatory to social activism. Now, in London, with the bombs falling, he was still concerned with images-albeit stills-and how they might also be put to use.
Back in the United States after the war, Stoney became a successful filmmaker himself. The small independent sponsored-film production company he then established was not without distinction. All My Babies, for example, received a rare accolade for a training film when it was selected for the 1952 Edinburgh Film Festival.
13 But it was the creation of discernable social value-improved mother and infant survival rates, in this case-that mattered to Stoney, not the geegaws of public recognition. He was determined to explore this potential through the agency of sponsored film. Yet he was by no means blind to the restrictions imposed by funders who did not necessarily share his ambitions.
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The flow of sponsored work did not falter as he began to teach at Stanford in the mid-1960s. It was to be exStanford student Sherr Klein, now moved on to the National Film Board of Canada, who suggested that he apply for a position there in 1968 as a film producer. Specifically, the NFB was looking for somebody to run a recently introduced, but faltering, documentary production program overtly designed to address social problems and encourage change, Challenge for Change/Société nouvelle. In his application for the job, remarkably preserved in draft in his archive, Stoney was able to stress a continuous record of positive socially concerned credits.
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While none have doubted the importance of the NFB, I still believe it has yet to receive proper recognition outside of Canada as one of documentary's crucial institutionscertainly as important to documentary development as that other production unit founded by John Grierson at the British General Post Office. In fact, the NFB arguably makes a better case for Grierson's legacy than does the GPO, but instead the board is seen, as Tom Waugh Roman Kroiter, NFB, Canada, 1961). And after all the technology and production, it was there at the film board at the end of the 1960s that the first steps toward a fundamental rethinking of the documentary film director's role were undertaken.
Stoney's application worked, and he found himself at the center of a vibrant debate about the nature of documentary. Three events-three films-impacted his thinking. Established NFB documentarist Colin Low had gone to Newfoundland in 1967 to direct a Griersonian socialvictim film but instead found himself renegotiating the relationship between filmmaker and subject. Lending his talents to a fishing community on the offshore Fogo Island, Low made a filmed case on the islanders' behalf and at their direction designed specifically to stop an otherwise unresponsive provincial government from forcibly evicting them and depopulating the island.
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For the documentarist, the need for the rebalancing of power between filmmaker and subject was becoming ever more pressing because of the increased flexibility of the equipment. The Direct Cinema movement luxuriated in intrusion, but the fact that this might deepen ethical concerns was by no means obvious to filmmakers. Frederick Wiseman expressed the standard view at the time: ''I couldn't make a film which gave someone else the right to control the final print.'' 19 Low, in elaborating what came to be called the ''Fogo Process,'' was arguing, in effect, exactly the opposite, as Stoney would soon do as well: that the traditional documentary 'subjects' ought to be trained to make their own films by the professionals, not merely perform in front of their cameras. Apart from the common social-victim themes-the disadvantaged-in his application form, he had also mentioned the need, as he saw it, for participatory ''testing'' (that is getting audience response and involvement)-both before and after the film was released:
20
This ''testing,'' although not unique, is in the same participatory direction of travel as Low's emerging production protocols. In Canada, Stoney would follow his instincts to realize that the surrender of direct directorial control to his subjects was the only logical endpoint. As he was to tell Alan Rosenthal, he reached the conclusion that he had spent much of his life ''making films about doctors or teachers or preachers that these people should have made themselves.''
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The second film in Stoney's in-tray as he arrived at the NFB was The Things I Cannot Change (Tanya Ballentyne, 1967). Stoney's predecessor, Frank Kemeny, had commissioned a film on urban poverty, funded in part by the Canadian Privy Council, as a precursor to the Challenge for Change project. According to Brenda Longfellow's account, it had been screened, unusually for an NFB film, ''with incredible fanfare'' on CBC in the spring of 1967. 22 Although certainly no celebration of what Joris Ivens once called ''exotic dirt,'' the film still presented a searing picture of the condition of the urban underclass. 23 Longfellow, however, takes issue with the popularized story about its reception, according to which the neighbors of the documentary's central family were supposedly so upset by the exposure of the community that their cooperation with the filmmakers had occasioned that the family were forced to move away. 24 Reportedly, the NFB then decided to reconsider its consent procedures.
In her meticulous analysis of the production context and reception of the film, Longfellow suggests that this is something of an exaggeration, including the assertion that this caused the board to rethink the whole issue of filmmaker responsibility. Be that as it may, the controversy over the film highlighted the dangers of addressing the mass audience on behalf of Griersonian social victims. In that, The Things I Cannot Change was the obverse of the Fogo films.
Such uproars led Stoney to conclude: ''People should do their own filming, or at least feel they control the content.'' 25 However, even this last was hard in the usual ''non-Fogo'' director/subject relationship. For subjects actually to do the filming for themselves without considerable training was impossible, given the complexity of the process in the pre-digital universe. Filming was always getting in the way.
The third film in Stoney's in-tray, You Are on Indian Land (Mort Ransen, NFB, Canada, 1969), directly addressed this problem. With the not entirely helpful support of the Department of Indian Affairs, a First Nations film crew had been trained as professional filmmakers, and You Are on Indian Land became the first Fogo Process documentary to result. Again, it was made in the dominant observational Direct Cinema mode to chronicle a protest that closed the road joining the United States and Canada via a bridge across the St. Lawrence, which traversed First Peoples' land. But the film was no mere news story. Unlike The Things . . . (but like most of the Fogo titles) it had a targeted audience: First Nations peoples never before had been addressed by a film made by their own. 26 Both the Fogo films and The Things . . . were conventional in that they were made by film professionals. You Are on Indian Land was also made by professionals, but these were First Nations people especially trained for the job. So the film was not only made for its subjects in a targeted fashion, it was made by its (admittedly highly professionalized) subjects as well, according to the Fogo Process.
Such, then, is the context in which Stoney began his work as the Challenge for Change producer.
''Eliminate the 'middlemen'-the filmmakers''
The freshness of the issue before Stoney was not so much a matter of topics or tone, where the image of the Griersonian victim still dominated. Nor did it involve a new aesthetic: Direct Cinema, now a decade old, was the preferred mode. Rather, what was new was the application of a new sensitivity to the relationship of filmmaker and subject and a sense that a targeted audience was more important than a mass one.
A film project was suggested to Stoney early on: a look at welfare recipients, not as Griersonian/Wisemanian figures of helpless social victims, but rather, as with Fogo, to allow them to voice their complaints as prisoners of a debasing and insensitive system. Terry McCartney-Filgate shot the austere Up Against the System (NFB, Canada, 1969), giving complainants an unimpeded opportunity to illuminate what it felt like to be a recipient of welfare. Apart from the usual general distribution as an amorphous consciousness-raising exercise, the film was shown at regional staff meetings of welfare officials all across Canada. 27 It was a re-education meant to materially change their view and improve their behavior toward their clients.
None of this was a smooth process. There were frictions with the Francophone E´quipe of the NFB/ONF. Stoney outraged both sides of the linguistic divide by suggesting a bilingual crew. He also earned the enmity of his Francophone secretary who was ''spying'' on him on their behalf. (She was transferred.) His preference for ''testing'' also brought him into conflict with the distribution department. Above all, projects such as Up Against the System scarcely endeared the NFB to the government bureaucrats whose deficiencies were exposed. Enmity cannot have been but exacerbated by the fact that the critical films were, after all, emanating from a government-funded entity. Stoney's paper archive confirms all this but adds personal color to the account. For Stoney, who wrote to everybody all the time, being in Canada did not mean that his flow of letters abated. He was assiduous throughout his life in keeping in touch with a wide network of friends, colleagues, acquaintances, and all of his family, including his (ex-)wife, her parents, his children, and his sister.
It is in the family correspondence in fact that one starts to get a feel for the context-the by no means entirely supportive situation-in which the Challenge for Change work (which must now be considered canonical) was being undertaken. Here, for example, is an excerpt from a letter to his sister Elizabeth Segal, ''Libba,'' written in December 1968, which gives Stoney's contemporary reading of the Franco/Anglo chasm at the board:
28
In
Nevertheless, these early months were as energizing as they were infuriating. Stoney was enthused by his own challenges in running the project. The clouds though were permanent.
The real problem came to turn on the business of who actually, in any conventional traditional sense, was making the ''films.'' Skilled technical effort was still very much in play even when the subjects got control of the cameras, as with the teenagers or the Mohawk unit, but as Dorothy Todd Hénaut recalled:
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At Challenge for Change, we were wracking our brains to find a way to eliminate the ''middlemen''-the filmmakers-and put the cameras directly in the hands of ordinary people. Unfortunately, working with even the light, 16 mm cameras took years of apprenticeship. We experimented with slide shows and 8 mm film, but they were awkward, and of limited usefulness as a communication tool.
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The answer, of course, was already at hand in the NFB equipment storehouse. On a visit to New York, Robert Forget, a member of the Francophone E´quipe, had acquired a reel-to-reel ''home video'' Portapak more or less as it first hit the stores in 1967. Klein and Todd Hénaut became aware of its presence in Montreal in the fall of 1968 and determined to experiment with it-but not by using it themselves. Hénaut remembers:
Bonnie Klein and I wanted to experiment with this new equipment, by putting it in the hands of a Montreal citizens' committee, to see if they would be able to use it themselves. George Stoney immediately recognized the usefulness of this innovative idea, and backed us up totally. He pulled portable cameras and editing decks out of a hat, and we asked the Comité des Citoyens de St-Jacques if they would be interested in learning to use this new communication tool.
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To James Stoney (''Jamie''), November 5, 1970 To Elizabeth Segal (''Libba''), October 5, 1969 43 To Mrs. ''Red'' Burns September 12, 1983. 47 To James and Edna Bruce (''Matron'' and ''Prof''), March 23, 1971 46 To Walter Dale, April 29, 1971 45 To Dorothy Todd Hénaut, February 5, 1971 To quote Sherr Klein: ''Happily, George did impose one condition. 'You can do this thing,' he said, 'but only if you document it on 16 mm film, because video is undistributable and the experience must be disseminated.' The film was called VTR St-Jacques and disseminate it he did-the rest is the history of public access.''
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The challenges of video were not limited to distribution and exhibition difficulties. As with the Griersonians and their long resistance to 16 mm film, there was a mind-set problem. 33 An enthusiastic embrace of the new was by no means in general evidence at the board. Rather, videoa technology marketed for ''home'' (or scarcely less worrying, ''industrial'') use-was seen as a threat to film professionalism. In an institution whose very name was technologically limited-it was, after all, a film board, founded indeed by John Grierson himself-video was prima facie suspect. Naturally enough, given this context and the newness of the technology, it was easier still to be thinking in terms of films, such as the resulting VTR St.-Jacques (Bonnie Sherr Klein, 1969 ) and the other productions), the Fogo Process notwithstanding. To be able to talk in terms of titles was a protection and it also sustained Stoney's enthusiasm. This mind-set persisted as projects came to fruition, and he was able to present a good face on the enterprise to his family into the second year of his contract. In the fall of 1969 he was writing to his son about this. 34 Nevertheless, in the letters, such positives were in constant contrast to reports of the stresses of the situation. These were not all a consequence of internal problems at the board, from its bureaucratic mind-set to the linguistic divide. Also in play were the political ambitions of the Challenge for Change project, indeed the reasons for its formation in the first place. These were a reflection of a zeitgeist that included the tense Canadian politics of the time. Francophone separatists were rioting in Quebec, the charismatic Francophone Pierre Trudeau was elected prime minister, and the governance of the First Nations was being controversially reorganized. Canada was far from immune to the societal forces that were in play across the West: the struggles for rights-for women, for ethnic and sexual identities; the fight against capital; and, above all, the war in Vietnam, the impact of which was nearly as profound north of the 49th parallel as south. 35 Still, for Stoney, the Canadian situation overall was preferable to the divisive conditions in play to the south. To his ex-in-laws, he wrote in October 1969 an explanation of why Canada, despite everything, remained preferable to the United States. The observation had been provoked by a visit to Libba and her husband, Ben Segal, in Washington.
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Hope and sanity were not that much in evidence at the board, however. For one thing, inevitably, for a tax-funded organization with ambitions to effect social change of an often oppositional nature, pressures on the budgetalways a threat to any organization in hock to the state-were increasing. At the end of his first year, even as he was being upbeat to Jamie, Stoney shared a different perspective with Libba.
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This included the kind of ''crap'' he was used to as independent producer: looking for money. Despite being funded by the Canadian taxpayer, the NFB was not as stable financially as might be expected. Stoney found himself being directly involved in campaigning not only to protect his productions but also to help diversify the board's revenue sources.
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This is not at all surprising; but it should not be forgotten that, beyond budget cuts, systemic bureaucratic foulups and some films still recognizable as such, Stoney was now actually presiding over a ''rewriting of the book'' on what NFB management traditionally considered to be the means of fulfilling its public remit.
The National Film Board had been established, under Grierson's guidance on the eve of World War II, to make films ''to interpret Canada to Canadians and to other nations.'' 39 More and more, Stoney's effort was to encourage work unrecognizable to a Griersonian. Instead of films, made to acceptable levels of professional ''standards,'' the template was now VTR St-Jacques. Thus Challenge for Change was increasingly providing only ''poor quality'' videos made by amateurs (as any Griersonian would see it). The management's distress was therefore not entirely unwarranted. Challenge for Change was not, after all, a program that had been designed to change documentary, nor to rethink its norms, but, in effect, that is what it came to be doing. As its focus moved more and more to community video, the NFB management was increasingly anxious about what actual films were going to emerge. Stoney had no immediate answers to this. As he once told me, he was simply having to insist to his bosses that ''he did not know'' as the Portapak video projects all over Canada were in the hands of the people involved, not his.
The need to placate funders (aka NFB's management) did not dampen what was to become for Stoney a positively evangelical commitment to the use of video; not, of course, as a technology but, rather, as the tool needed for democratizing documentary production in the name of social activism. This was a task worth any number of irritations. By the spring of 1970, however, the brave face was masking disillusion.
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His contract would not be renewed. That fall, George Stoney and the NFB parted ways. The usual emollient face was put on this: the man who had brought him to Canada two years earlier, Frank Spiller, the head of English Production at the board, wrote a soothing cover letter.
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The country to which Stoney returned in 1970 was rocked by social change, its calm further fractured by continued divisions over the war in Vietnam. Even without his long history of social engagement, Stoney would not want to avoid being a participant in the situation in the United States. As he had written to his ex-in-laws, he knew that American funds were available to pursue a role as an activist, however much long experience had taught him that the political effect of any such media action was likely illusionary. As a result, he was not so committed to Canada that his leaving was distressing. Nevertheless, there can be little question that the board was not happy with the direction he had taken the Challenge for Change project. Spiller might have recognized that Stoney had effected a sea change on the concept of the director's role that would eventually have repercussions for documentary far beyond the NFB. But the lack of product in a recognizable form was a stumbling block. Terry McCartneyFilgate is certain that he was denied the job as George's successor exactly because he was just as committed to video, the Fogo Process, and social activism as George had been, and that the board had had enough of that.
42 As for George, he was by now halfway across the bridge from traditional filmmaker to participatory access and beyond.
''A Challenge for Change-type film effort back home'' George Stoney returned to New York City and was hired to head the undergraduate program at New York University's film school. He also resumed his career as an independent documentary filmmaker-a combination of teaching and practice that he had developed in the 1950s. But now, additionally, he had an ambition that could not be fulfilled by either of these roles: how to establish a Challenge for Change project in the United States. This was to be the biggest challenge he brought back from Canada, and he had been thinking about it for some time.
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The Portapak made the rethinking of documentary's basic protocols easier-it made such a project viable-but Stoney knew full well that a National Film Board of the United States was an impossibility. He was well aware of the frictions the Rooseveltian Film Service had caused in the 1930s. The hostility of Hollywood to any tax-funded rival fueled atavistic Republican distrust of such government initiatives. First Amendment sensitivities were also in play. And this was before even considering the essentially oppositional, participatory, and empowering agenda of a Challenge for Change. Stoney, however, hit upon a scheme. Martin Lucas, the ex-NYU Stoney student mentioned earlier, points up the discontinuities involved looking forward to Stoney as the ''father of YouTube''-but there is another discontinuity: backwards from community cable television to the NFB. Arguably, Stoney conceived of the cable access channels as being, exactly, the nearest he could get to a film board dedicated to distributing and exhibiting social activist materials. In this way, not only would the citizenry be given a voice, but citizens would speak directly to each other and to power through access to technology, training, and distribution.
The Portapak was the key. People could be trained to use a 16 mm Arriflex BL or an É clair-that had been proved at the NFB-but the technology was forbidding and prohibitively expensive. Portapaks were neither: they were accessible and comparatively cheap; and their efficacy in the hands of ''amateurs'' for the purposes of social communication had also been proved at the board. As he began work at NYU, he of course introduced video into the classroom. Stoney, though, self-deprecatingly as usual, suggested that any one of a number of his colleagues could have done the same. The pedagogical advantages of video for documentary work were that glaringly obvious. Less so was how to extend the technology for the purposes of community activism, to more effectively involve the general public in the democratic process. He figured out that student use of video could be the first step.
Within weeks of the start of the academic year he was writing to Jamie.
Within months, this was coalescing into the idea of a center and he was writing to Dorothy Todd Hénaut.
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Two months later he was telling the ex-NFB colleague he had mentioned to Libba, Walter Dale, that the center was up and running. He was able to move so fast because, as he explained to his ex-in-laws, he had what he described as ''a remarkably favorable turn.''
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The money allowed Stoney and ''Mrs. Loyd Burns''-who would become the crucial figure, ''Red'' Burns-to re-create for him the same exciting environment as he had experienced with the Challenge for Change team. The new Alternate Media Center (AMC) therefore provides both the equipment and the skilled media operatives who could interact with community groups. As an established educational center within a university, it created a viable revenue stream. Red's stellar fundraising skills augmented this to give the AMC a proper research dimension, although George came to feel that the research initiative, as encapsulated by the technicist Interactive Telecommunications Program that Red initiated, eventually overshadowed the activist dimension he had wanted to be central. 47 The activist agenda required the involvement of a third party-the cable industry-and it took George's considerable political skill to make this happen. The obstacles were daunting. For one thing, the FCC, which was still clinging to the remains of its traditional defense of its broadcasting licensees against the upstart cable companies, prohibitedspuriously-the transmission of one-half-inch videotape in the name of ''standards.'' One of Stoney's first actions at NYU was, therefore, to make (as he reports in the abovequoted letter to Dale) ''one tape for the FCC, part of a plea to legalize half-inch tape.'' Obviously, without the removal of this regulation, Stoney's entire strategy would be stymied.
That accomplished, the cable companies would still have to be persuaded to set aside valuable channels, pro bono, for community use. However, as they needed municipal licenses at this time to run their cables and get into business, ''access'' could be parlayed into a measure of PR advantage.
As Stoney began his campaign to co-opt some of the industry's channel capacity for social activism, cable already had some 5.2 million subscribers, 8.8% of homes with television. This increased to 16% in 1972, 21% in 1973, and 20% in 1974. 48 FCC regulation would be required to make a community access provision-using non-professional video-a legal requirement of any cabling license; while arguing in any and all available forums for this, Stoney found a crucial ally in Commissioner Nick Johnson. Appointed by President Johnson (no relation), Commissioner Johnson represented the ambition of that president's long-past ''Big Society'' into the era of Richard Nixon. He was more than happy to champion the cause of enhanced media in the name of social responsibility against the broadcasters; and he was happy to do so at what many cable operators would see as their expense.
Brighter industry minds, however, realized that they were being cast in the role of parasites by the broadcasters (and many on the commission and elsewhere in Washington), so there was a clear PR advantage in being involved in such a worthy business. Here then was another span to Stoney's bridge-from Challenge for Change through the AMC and its training and media center facilitation programs to the cable industry. The need for regulation advanced by Stoney was acknowledged by the FCC regulation of 1972 so that: ''By 1980, an estimated 1300 of the nations 4600 cable systems were offering some form of non-automated access. About 700 had local live programming of some type. About 500 systems offered public access, 500 offered educational access channels, and 340 provided government access. '' 49 The provision of access had become an important part of the franchising process, as Patrick Parsons points out. It was a footnote to the development of the industry that represented in his view ''very much a part of the utopian vision of cable.''
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Stoney's vision of video and cable was always and inevitably utopianist. Nevertheless, he did astutely combine the training and production capabilities of the Alternate Media Center with the cable industry, which must have been startled to find itself cast in the role of providing a participatory exhibition environment.
Stoney pulled off the trick and found a way in the 1970s to duplicate the logics of Challenge for Change south of the 49th parallel. Of course, this was utopianist, as today's rhetoric of ''documedia'' is utopianist. And, of course, the AMC is no more, having metamorphosed into a more traditional university program. Cable television has been overlaid by satellite television just as it overlaid terrestrial broadcasting, and now satellite coexists with the Web. But these technological changes reveal exactly the continued relevance of George Stoney's work: that his legacy cannot be limited by technology is what renders it so important. His was the progressivist social agenda that lay behind the bridge-building of the late '60s. It led some in the documentary field and many more nonmedia people with whom they interacted in the early '70s away from the prior documentary tradition and its automatic claim on artistic privilege. Although that moment has largely passed, Stoney's concepts of the participatory suffuse progressive thinking about new documentary media to this day. The essence of that legacy is to insist that ends are more important than means, which is why Nick Johnson's blogged opinion that ''George Stoney's contributions to American democracy deserve to be listed along with those of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison'' is only just a tad hyperbolic. 51 While it might be more honored in the breach than in the observance, George's desire that all communication should finish with a handshake or a kiss remains a crucial best hope.
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